【经管院每周系列讲座第301期】Pre-Communication in a Coordination Game with Incomplete Information


Title: Pre-Communication in a Coordination Game with Incomplete Information Speaker: Lan Zhang and Rui Wang Time: 14:00-15:30, Lan Zhang; 15:30-16:30, Rui Wang, September 23, Friday Venue:  Yide building H503, Liulin Campus Abstract of Lan's talk:  We study the role of pre-communication in a coordination game with incomplete information. We show that pre-communication in the form of cheap talk does reduce the probability of miscoordination. In the most informative communication equilibrium there is an in finite number of messages, but perfect coordination can never be achieved. We then introduce a mediator who first communicates with agents and then chooses an outcome. Specically, we consider two scenarios. In the first scenario the mediator is able to commit to a decision rule beforehand, while in the second scenario the mediator is not able to commit beforehand.